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Health Inquiries a Violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act?
INTRODUCTION
T he Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was enacted m
1990 "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."2 While the most visible effect of the ADA to the general
public has been the noticeable increase in the number of wheelchair
ramps in public areas,3 protections under the ADA include mental as well
as physical disabilities.4
The Kentucky Board of Bar Examiners ("KBE") is charged by the
Kentucky Supreme Court to regulate Kentucky Bar admissions, including
a determination of the "character and fitness" of each applicant.5 On its
character and fitness questionnaire, the KBE makes a broad-based inquiry
regarding the applicant's past mental health history 6 Kentucky, like
many other jurisdictions, has recently modified its questions in response
to the ADA.7 While it is far from clear specifically which inquiries will
'42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12289 (Supp. 1993).
2Id. § 12101(b)(1) (Supp. 1993).
3 See Lon Crouch, Museums Working to Improve Access for Disabled
Visitors, SuN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Mar. 8, 1996, at B 1 (discussing how
public places m Florida have unproved accessibility for handicapped persons m
response to the ADA).
4 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 1993).
5 Ky. Sup. CT. R. 2.040.
6 For examples of the types of questions the KBE asks, see infra notes 22-
23 and accompanying text.
' Telephone Interview with Pat Gill, Executive Assistant, KBE (Nov 17,
1995) [hereinafter Gill Interview].
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
be allowed under the ADA, it does appear that the KBE's modifications
fail to meet the standard modem courts have set for compliance with the
ADA.
8
It is not immediately clear what the practical impact of the ADA will
be on those to whom the statute applies.' If past sweeping civil rights
legislation is any guide, then years of litigation will be required to define
the ever-changing parameters.'" As government agencies and private
businesses struggle to determine specifically how they must change their
practices to conform to the new law," cases interpreting the ADA trickle
through the court system, slowly outlining the specific behavior deemed
necessary under the law.
One issue currently facing state boards of bar examiners is whether
or to what extent mental health inquiries of bar applicants are allowed
under the ADA. To date, the trend has been toward allowing inquiries
into specific, current impairments that the board has determined would
have an effect on an applicant's ability to practice law. 2 However,
while some state supreme courts have addressed the issue, no guidance
has been offered from the federal system beyond the district court
level. 3
There are advocates both for and against the inclusion of such
questions on bar applications. Opponents often condemn such inquiries
as discriminatory and violative of the ADA, 4 while proponents
8 See infra notes 80-128 and accompanying text.
9 The ADA applies to the areas of employment, public services, public
accommodations and services operated by private entities. See infra notes 40-42
and accompanying text.
" Much litigation occurred after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988) and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988).
" See Minding Your Business, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 18, 1996, at El
(answering reader's questions about conforming with the ADA); Aiding the
Disabled, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRBUNE, Mar. 11, 1996, at C1 (discussing the
economic benefits of complying with the ADA).
12 See infra notes 80-128 and accompanying text; see also LAURA F.
ROTHsTEN, DISABILITY LAW 321 (1995). For example, mental health questions
on the Texas bar application are limited to specific mental disorders affecting
performance, rather than general questions regarding prior mental health
treatment. Id. at 321.
13 See infra notes 80-128 and accompanying text.
" See Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Ask About Conduct, Not
Mental Illness: A Proposal for Bar Examiners and Medical Boards to Comply
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emphasize the need of bar examiners to protect the public and argue that
the questions are legal under the ADA. 5 An opponent of mental health
inquiries has argued that "[s]tate bars should devote energy to disciplining
unethical conduct, not prognosticating failure for those applicants who
have had the courage and foresight to seek professional help. 16 On the
other hand, an official for the ABA Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar disagrees, calling assertions that the ADA bars all
inquiry into an applicant's mental health an "unfortunate detour" in the
approach to dealing with mental illness in the area of legal practice. 7
She concludes that "[t]his is a misuse of a watershed of civil rights
legislation.""8
Courts have recently enjoined boards of bar examiners in two states
from using general mental health questions,'9 and a number of states
have changed their questions in response to, or under the threat of, such
a suit.2" Moreover, the National Conference of Bar Examiners has
narrowed the scope of its recommended mental health inquiries, and the
American Bar Association has adopted a resolution recommending that
mental health questions be drafted narrowly to "elicit information about
with the ADA and Constitution, 20 J. LEGIS. 147 (1994); Kathi Pugh, No: Mental
Health Treatment Should Not Block a Career, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 37; Carol
J. Banta, Note, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on State Bar
Examiners'Inquiries into the PsychologicallHistory ofBar Applicants, 94 MICH.
L. REv. 167 (1995); Mary E. Cisneros, Note, A Proposal to Eliminate Broad
Mental Health Inquiries on Bar Examination Applications: Assessing an
Applicant's Fitness to Practice Law by Alternative Means, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHcs 401 (1995).
" Erica Moeser, Yes: The Public Has the Right to Know about Instability,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 36; Charles L. Reischel, The Constitution, the Disability
Act, and Questions about Alcoholism, Addiction, and Mental Health, B.
EXAMINER, Aug. 1992, at 10.
16 Pugh, supra note 14, at 37.
'" Moeser, supra note 15, at 36. At the time her article was published, Ms.
Moeser was Chairperson-elect of the ABA Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar. Id.
18 Id.
"9 See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.
1995); In re Underwood, 1993 WL 649283 (Me. Dec. 7, 1993); infra notes 83-
99, 105-07 and accompanying text.
20 Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F.Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla.
1994); Reischel, supra note 15 (discussing the District of Columbia's
modification of its mental health inquiries under threat of an ADA suit); infra
notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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current fitness to practice law, and take steps to ensure that their
processes do not discourage those who would benefit from seeking
professional assistance with personal problems and issues of mental health
from doing so." '21
The KBE's Application for Kentucky Bar Examination and
Questionnairefor Certification of Character and Fitness question twenty-
eight asks applicants: "Have you been diagnosed or received regular
treatment for amnesia, emotional disturbance, nervous or mental disorder
within the last five (5) years?"2 If the applicant replies "yes," she must
sign a form authorizing the release of the applicant's medical records.'
This Note neither advocates nor opposes eliminating all mental health
inquiries by bar examiners, and will leave the debate over the merits of
such mental health inquiries in predicting professional behavior to those
trained in psychology. This Note will merely demonstrate that the KBE's
inquiry remains broader than the trend of state boards across the nation
to reform their mental health inquiries to conform to the ADA, and that
it is doubtful that the K.BE's question would be upheld under the
standards established by the courts which have addressed this issue to
date.
2 4
Part I of this Note shows that the ADA applies to the KBE.25 Part
H discusses what practices constitute illegal discrimination under the
ADA.2s Part I examines how courts in other jurisdictions have ruled
on this issue and applies their rationales to the KBE's current inquiry.27
2 ABA Resolution adopted at meeting of August 9-10, 1994. Text was
taken from materials distributed at the Joint Conference on Disability Issues,
Hyatt Regency, St. Louis, Mo. 74 (Apr. 6-8, 1995).
22 KENTUCKY BOARD OF BAR ExAMINERs, QUESTIONNAME FOR
CERTIFICATION OF CHARACTER & FITNESS 6, question 28 (revised Dec. 1995)
[hereinafter QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CERTIFICATION].
The KBE is again reviewing the questionnaire for revision, but as of
November 17, 1995, question 28 is not one of the questions being considered for
revision. Gill Interview, supra note 7.
23 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CERTIFICATION, supra note 22.
24 See infra notes 160-64 and accompanyingtext. This Note does not address
the similar issue of whether questions regarding drug or alcohol addiction by bar
examiners violate the ADA. Kentucky question 26 asks: "Within the last five (5)
years, have you been, addicted to, or have you undergone treatment for the use
of narcotics, drugs, prescription drugs or the excessive use of intoxicating
liquor?" QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CERTIFICATION, supra note 22, at 6.
25 See infra notes 29-51 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 52-79 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 80-135 and accompanying text. The author did not
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Finally, in Part IV, this Note addresses the circumstances under which the
Kentucky inquiries can be challenged under the ADA.28
I. THE ADA APPLIES TO THE KBE
A. The KBE
In Kentucky, the state constitution vests regulation of the bar in the
Kentucky Supreme Court. Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution
states: "The Supreme Court shall, by rule, govern admission to the bar
and the discipline of members of the bar."'29 The current language of §
116 is the result of an amendment in 1975 that "extended the judicial
function to include the administration of the business affairs of the
judicial branch of the government," removing such administration from
the jurisdiction of the legislative branch.3" Consequently, regulation of
the Kentucky Bar has been found to be a judicial determination rather
than an administrative function.3
Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 2.000 created the KBE and charged
it with "the responsibility of administering the bar examination to
qualified applicants for admission to the bar of the Commonwealth." '32
Rule 2.040 created the Committee on Character and Fitness.33 These
rules require the KBE and its committees to act on behalf of the
conduct a comprehensive poll of every state board of bar examiners' mental
health inquiry, and has relied on published court cases and articles on the subject
for examples of the various questions to compare to the KBE's questions. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia did include such
a comprehensive breakdown of questions in Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 438-40 nn.14-19 (E.D. Va. 1995). See infra notes
83-99. This author did not rely on this list given the rapid developments in this
area. For example, the KBE modified its mental health question following the
Clark decision. See supra note 22.
2 See infra notes 136-62 and accompanying text.
29 Ky. CONST. § 116.
30 Exparte Auditor of Pub. Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Ky. 1980).
3' Sparks v. Characterand Fitness Comm., 818 F.2d 541, 544-45 (6th Cir.
1987), vacated and remanded, 484 U.S. 1022 (1988).
32 KY. Sup. CT. R. 2.000. The rule requires the Board to be composed of
seven attorneys appointed by the Kentucky Supreme Court for terms of three
years. Id.
31 Id. 2.040. The Committee is comprised of three attorneys appointed by
the Supreme Court to serve three year terms. Id.
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Kentucky Supreme Court in administering procedures for admission to
the Kentucky Bar and in determining the "character and fitness" of
applicants as a condition precedent to admission.34
While the Kentucky Supreme Court delegated its constitutional
authority to regulate the "character and fitness" of bar applicants, it
provided broad parameters as to how the Committee was to establish such
"fitness."'35 Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 2.012 defines "fitness" as
"the assessment of mental and emotional health as it affects the
competence of a prospective lawyer."'36 The purpose of this requirement
is "to exclude from the practice of law any person having a mental or
emotional illness or condition which would be likely to prevent the
person from carrying out duties to clients, courts or the profession." '37
The rules clarify that the supreme court is interested in "present
fitness." '3 Therefore, "prior mental or emotional illness or conditions are
relevant only so far as they indicate the existence of a present lack of
fitness."'39
B. Application of the ADA to the KBE
The ADA focuses on discrimination in three broad areas: employment
(Title I),4 public services (Title ]),4 and public accommodations and
services operated by private entities (Title III).42 While it has been
argued that Title I of the ADA should apply to state boards of bar
examiners because of the analogies between professional licensing bodies
and employers,43 all court action applying the ADA to bar admission to







4042 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. 1993). See infra notes 53-65 and
accompanying text.
41 Id. §§ 12131-12165. See infra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
42 Id. §§ 12181-12289.
43 "Unless admitted to the bar, a law school graduate cannot work as an
attorney... Licensing is merely one step removed from employment and is an
essential condition to practice." Coleman & Shellow, supra note 14, at 176.
4 See infra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
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Title II defines "public entity" as "any ... instrumentality of a
State."'45 Official comments to Department of Justice regulations clarify
that "Title II coverage ... includes activities of the legislative and
judicial branches of [s]tate and local governments. All governmental
activities of public entities are covered .... 6
The Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized that "[tihe root source
of all power validly exercised by any officer or agency of the state
government is, of course, its Constitution." '47 The court has also stressed
that the Kentucky Bar Association "does not exist for the private benefit
of the legal community."' Further, in order to carry out its mission,49
the Association must "maintain a proper discipline of the bar,. . . initiate
and supervise appropriate means to insure a high standard of professional
competence, and ... bear a substantial responsibility for promoting the
efficiency and improvement of the judicial system itself."5 Since the
power of the supreme court to regulate admissions to the Kentucky Bar
stems directly from the Kentucky Constitution,5 and exists to benefit
the public interest, the board, created to regulate bar admissions, clearly
constitutes a "public entity," as defined in the ADA. Therefore, Title II
of the ADA applies to the KBE.
II. PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ADA
In general, the ADA defines an individual with a disability as
someone who has "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such impairment; or (C) is regarded as having such an
impairment."'52 Application of this definition to those covered by the act
is further defined in Title I (employment), Title II (public entities) and
Title III (public accommodations).
4 42 U.S.C. § 12131(l)(B) (Supp. 1993).
46 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local
Government Services, 28 C.F.R. § 35.102 (1991).
4' Ex Parte Auditor of Pub. Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Ky. 1980).
48 Id. at 689 (holding that the Kentucky Auditor has no legal authority with
respect to the Kentucky Bar Association, as the Association is solely under the
control of the Judicial branch).
49 "The mission of the Association is to see to it that this trust is performed
with fidelity to the high principles of their calling." Id.
5o Id.
5 KY. CONST. § 116.
52 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
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A. Title I (Employment)
If Title I applied to the practices of the KBE in regulating admission
to the Kentucky Bar, the KBE's current broad mental health inquiries
would be barred for all practical purposes. 3 Title I prohibits
discrimination by an employer against an otherwise qualified individual
because of disability. 4 "An otherwise qualified individual" is defined as
a disabled person who, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position."55
Discrimination is defined as "limiting, segregating, or classifying a
disabled applicant so as to adversely affect his status or opportunity based
on his disability."56 This also includes "utilizing standards [or] criteria
.. that have the effect of discrimination."
57
Department of Justice regulations directly prohibit employers from
conducting "a medical examination of an applicant or making inquiries
as to whether an applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the
nature or severity of such disability."58 However, employers may ask
questions that relate to the applicant's ability "to perform job-related
functions, and/or may ask the applicant to describe or demonstrate how
with or without reasonable accommodation the applicant will be able to
perform job-related functions."59 Official comments to the regulations
clarify that such inquiries must be "narrowly tailored."6
" But see Reischel, supra note 15, at 24 n. 19, which argues that broad
mental health inquiries by bar examiners do conform to what Title I requires of
employers, because information on the application is not used to prevent any
applicant from sitting for the examination.
[M]ental health information is only examined after qualifications have
been demonstrated, and only as the last step before admission.
Furthermore, all applicants who qualify are scrutinized for mental health
information. Arguably, this comports with the basic process mandated
by Title I; that mental health scrutiny not be done until qualifications
are first established, and that, if such an examination is done, it is done
for everyone.
Id.
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 1993).
5 1 d. § 12111(8).
56 Id. § 12112(b).
57 Id. § 12112(b)(3)(A).
58 Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 29
C.F.R. § 1630.13 (1991).
59 Id. § 1630.14.
60 DEPARTMENT OF JusTIcE ADA HANDBOOK, INTERPRETIvE GUIDANCE TO
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Based on these definitions, if a law firm asked the same mental health
questions asked by the KBE as part of a regular hiring practice, it would
clearly violate the Department of Justice's regulations under Title I. In
fact, the official comments to Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") regulations issued under Title I use as an example
that "a law firm could not reject an applicant with a history of disabling
mental illness based on a generalized fear that the stress of trying to make
partner might trigger a relapse of the individual's mental illness."61
Official comments to the Department of Justice's regulations clarify
that "[t]he employer may describe or demonstrate the job function and
inquire whether or not the applicant can perform that function with or
without reasonable accommodation."62 Advocates for behavior-based
questions over general mental health inquiries have proposed the
following questions to determine "mental health" in the context of fitness
to practice law:
1. Have you ever been expelled, suspended from, or had
disciplinary action taken against you by any educational institution? If
so, explain the circumstances.
2. Has your grade point average ever varied by half a letter grade
or more between two terms? If so, explain the circumstances.
3. Have you ever been absent from school or a job for more than
[thirty] consecutive days? If so, explain the circumstances.
4. Have you ever been fired from, asked to leave, or had
disciplinary action taken against you in any job? If so, explain the
circumstances.
5. Have you ever been evicted or asked to vacate a place in which
you lived? If so, explain the circumstances.
6. Have you ever been arrested for D.U.I. [Driving Under the
Influence]? If so, explain the circumstances, including the outcome of
the incident.63
While analogies can be made between professional licensing
associations and employers, a bar association does not qualify as an
SECTION 1630.14, 1-71 (1991) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ADA
HANDBOOK].
61 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1991).
62 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 60, at 1-71.
63 Coleman & Shellow, supra note 14, at 177.
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employer of members of the bar.'4 Therefore, Title I definitions will
probably only come into play if courts infer Title I protections in Title II.
It remains unclear, however, whether courts will make such an
inference.6"
B. Title 11 (Public Entities)
The definition of "discrimination" in Title II does not ihclude the
specific prohibitions included in Title I. Title II states that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participating in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by such entity."66 Department of Justice regulations under Title II
directly apply the title's provisions to state sponsored professional
licensing: "A public entity may not administer a licensing or certification
program in a manner that subjects qualified individuals with disabilities
to discrimination on the basis of a disability."67 Given the broad
statutory language, it is doubtful that a successful challenge to the
Department of Justice's inclusion of professional licensing under Title II
coverage could be launched.68 This is especially true in Kentucky, where
4 "Covered entity" for purposes of Title I includes "an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor management committee."
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1991). ButseeW. Sherman Rogers, The ADA, Title VII, and
the Bar Examination: The Nature and Extent of the ADA s Coverage of Bar
Examinations and an Analysis of the Applicability of Title VI1 to Such Tests, 36
How. L.J. 1, 12 (1993) (arguing that bar examiners would be included as agents
of a state's governmental body, and thus employers, under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
65 See Reischel, supra note 15, at 18 ("The operative provision of Title II
[the general prohibition of discrimination found at 42 U.S.C. § 12132] does not
contain language similar to that in Title I barring inquiries into disabilities. Nor,
despite a phrase in the statute and some legislative history which might be used
to argue to the contrary, does it appear that this particular prophylactic provision
in Title I is imported into Title II."). But see Coleman & Shellow, supra note 14,
at 174 (relying on 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a) and Judiciary Committee Report, H.R.
Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 84 (1990) to conclude: "Title I
provisions are applicable to Title H.").
66 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. 1993).
67 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (1991).
68 At least two courts have accepted the argument that the Department of
Justice regulations are not too specific given the broad statutory language. See
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it can be inferred that the Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized the
KBE as a public entity. 9 Therefore, the question becomes whether the
KBE's practices violate the language of Title II, or, in other words,





Critics of general mental health inquiries claim that such inquiries are
irrelevant to the determination of an applicant's "character and
fitness. ' 71 It has been argued that "[t]he mere presence of mental illness
or substance abuse no more impacts on an individual's character [and
fitness] than the existence of coronary artery disease or cancer.' 72
Ironically, commentators point out that the failure to inquire about
physical illness "demonstrates prejudice against mental disorders and a
basic misunderstanding of mental illness .... By asking only about
mental or emotional problems, rather than any illness, licensing boards
invidiously discriminate against a particular group. 73 It is doubtful,
however, that these commentators would find the mere addition of
increased health inquiries to be the solution under the ADA.74
Regardless of whether the specific prohibitions found in Title I apply
to Title H,7' the broad prohibitions found in Title II could restrict the
inquiries.76 Title II places the burden on bar associations to demonstrate
Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F. Supp. 1489, 1493 n.6 (So. Dist.
Fla. 1994) (stating that Title H governs the licensing and regulation of attorneys
"if the broad anti-discriminatory language of Title II is read in conjunction with
the regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice ... ."); Kinney v.
Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547, 548 (E.D. Pa.) ("Rather than outline the specific
obligations of public entities under [Title HI], the ADA directed the Department
of Justice to promulgate regulations.. . ."), affd, 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied sub nom. Hoskins v. Kinney, 114 S. Ct. 1545 (1994).
69 See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 67.
"' See Coleman & Shellow, supra note 14, at 151.
72 id.
73 Id. at 157.
4 Again, this Note will not fully discuss the relevance of such mental health
inquiries. For a full discussion of this issue, see id.
75 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 68; see also Reischel, supra note 15, at 19.
[T]he language of Title II does not specify a "no inquiry" requirement;
the legislative history does not require that one be read into Title II; the
Title II regulations have not done so; and the reasons which prompted




the clear need for such inquiries to protect the public. As one
commentator noted, "The ADA clearly places the burden of justifying a
discriminatory practice on the entity employing it."77 It is up to the
courts, however, to determine whether broad based mental health
inquiries constitute a discriminatory practice.7" Therefore, since an
applicant who must make an affirmative response to the KBE's mental
health inquiries constitutes a "qualified person" with a disability under the
ADA, the burden is on the KBE to justify its practice of requiring
disclosure of this information.7
II. THE KBE's QUESTION DOES NOT REFLECT
THE CURRENT TREND TOWARD NARROw MENTAL
HEALTH INQUIRIES AND WOULD NOT STAND UNDER
ANY STANDARD DEVELOPED IN THE COURTS TO DATE
A. Procedures and Questions Struck Down
It has been argued that the ADA does not allow any mental health
inquiries by boards of bar examiners.8" The Department of Justice has
taken this position and stated in an amicus curiae brief that any mental
health classifications are unnecessary and, therefore, discriminatory under
the ADA."l However, courts which have stricken specific mental health
questions have not adopted the Department's position on this issue and,
Id. The author goes on to argue that the District of Columbia's practice with
respect to its mental health inquiries conforms generally to what Title I requires
of employers. Id. at 19-20.
71 Id. at 22, 24 n.27 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 35.103(b)(7) (1991), which states
that a public entity must modify discriminatory practices "unless the public entity
can demonstrate" that doing so would fundamentally alter the program); 29
C.F.R. § 35.103(b)(8) (1991) (public entity shall not employ practices with
discriminatory effect "unless such.., can be shown to be necessary for the...
program .... ).
78 See infra notes 80-128 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Coleman & Shellow, supra note 14, at 158 ("As the sensitivity
of the personal information disclosed, and hence the intrusion of the right to
confidentiality, increases the burden on the state to justify a disclosure will
increase under the balancing test.").
o See supra notes 14, 16 and accompanying text.
81 See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 444 n.25
(E.D. Va. 1995).
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thus, have not closed the door on all inquiries of this kind. To date, no
jurisdiction has upheld a mental health inquiry as broad as Kentucky's
under the ADA; however, some that have been stricken were even
broader than that of Kentucky. 2
1. Virginia
The KBE's question twenty-eight is nearly identical to the question
struck down by the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia in Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners.3 The Virginia
application asked: "Have you within the past five (5) years, been treated
or counselled for a mental, emotional or nervous disorders [sic]?"84 The
court analyzed the question under Title II of the ADA (Public Entities) 5
and did not address whether the Title I (Employment)86 definitions were
relevant.87 Therefore, the decision revolved around whether the Virginia
Board's question subjected "persons with disabilities to discrimination on
the basis of their disability.
88
The court found that "an attorney's uncontrolled and untreated mental
or emotional illness may result in injury to clients and the public"8 9 and
accepted the underlying assumption that, at some stage of the application
process, some form of mental health inquiry was appropriate.90 However,
the Clark court held that the Virginia Board failed to show that its
question was "necessary to the performance of its duty to license only fit
bar applicants."'" The court reasoned that Virginia's question
"discriminate[d] against disabled applicants by imposing additional
eligibility criteria.
92
82 See infra notes 83-122 and accompanying text.
83 Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 433.
84 Id.
85 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (1994).
86 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
87 Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 441.
88 Id. at 442.
89 Id. at 436.
90 Id.
9, Id. at 446.
92 Id. The court went on to state that "While certain severe mental or
emotional disorders may pose a direct threat to public safety, the Board has made
no individualized finding that obtaining evidence of mental health counseling or
treatment is effective in guarding against this threat." Id.
1995-96]
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The court offered little guidance as to what type mental health
inquiry it would allow under the ADA, stating that its job was to "decide
whether the current question complied with the ADA."'93 Therefore, the
court concluded that it should "refrain from offering any dictum
guidance.
94
The KBE's question asks: "Have you been diagnosed or received
regular treatment for amnesia, emotional disturbance, nervous or mental
disorder within the last five (5) years?"95 If the answer is aTirmative,
the applicant must complete a medical waiver which allows the release
of the applicant's medical records regarding the diagnosis or treatment.96
Similar to the disclaimer accompanying the stricken Virginia Board's
question,97 the KBE includes a prominent disclaimer to question twenty-
eight which states: "THIS QUESTION IS NOT INTENDED TO APPLY
TO ISOLATED INSTANCES OF CONSULTATION FOR CONDI-
TIONS OF EMOTIONAL STRESS."98 The stricken Virginia language
did not allow nondisclosure of "isolated instances of consultation for
conditions of emotional distress" but merely indicated that such disclo-
sures would not affect the applicant's bar admission. Therefore, the
Kentucky language appears to lessen one of the primary concerns of
mental health inquiry opponents - that law students will avoid potentially
helpful counselling in times of stress if they must include it in their bar
application.99 Even with its stronger disclaimer, however, it is doubtful
93 Id.
94id.
9 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CERTIFICATION, supra note 22, at 6.
96 Id. at Form 4.
9' The Virginia Bar Application question states:
The members of the Board recognize that stress of law school, as well
as other life factors, frequently result in applicants seeking psychiatric
or psychological counseling. The Board encourages you to obtain
counseling or treatment if you believe that you may benefit from it.
Because generally only severe forms of mental or emotional problems
will trigger an investigation or impact on bar admission decisions, your
decision to seek counselling should not be colored by your bar
application.
Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 433.
98 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CERTIFICATION, supra note 22, at 6. The KBE has
long recognizedthe differencebetween such isolated instances of emotional stress
and other, more relevant, mental illness. This disclaimer predates the ADA by
at least ten years. Gill Interview, supra note 7.
'9 See supra note 14.
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that the Clark court would find the Kentucky inquiry "necessary to the
performance of [the KBE's] duty to license only fit bar applicants"
because the text of the Kentucky question remains as broad as the text
stricken by the Clark court.
2. Florida
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
denied a Florida Board of Bar Examiners' motion to dismiss an action to
enjoin the use of a similar question.00 The Florida Board's
questionnaire asked:
Have you ever consulted a psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health
counselor or medical practitioner for any mental, nervous or emotional
condition, drug or alcohol use? If yes, state the name and complete
address of each individual you consulted and the beginning and ending
dates of each consultation.
Have you ever been diagnosed as having a nervous, mental or
emotional condition, drug or alcohol problem? If yes, state the name
and complete address of each individual who made each diagnosis.
Have you ever been prescribed psychotropic medication? If yes,
state the name of each medication and the name and complete address
of each prescribing physician.'0 '
The court ruled that the question and subsequent inquiries discriminate
against applicants with mental health disabilities by "subjecting them to
additional burdens based on their disability."'0 2 After their motion to
dismiss was denied, the Florida Board voluntarily changed its question to
avoid further court proceedings.0 3
" Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F. Supp. 1489, 1498 (S.D.
Fla. 1994).
o Id. at 1491 n.1 (quoting the Florida Bar Application, question 29).
102 Id. at 1494. The court, citing Medical Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-
3670, 1993 WL 413016 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993), said that the questions were
impermissible because they "substitute an impermissible inquiry into the status
of disabled applicants for the proper, indeed necessary, inquiry into the
applicant's behavior." Id.
'03 See Stephen W. Townsend, Admission to the Bar Review by the
Committee on Character, N.J. L.J., Mar. 6, 1995, at 71. "Reportedly, however,
the Justice Department is prepared to continue the suit to force the exclusion of
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Again, the Kentucky question is somewhat narrower than the Florida
inquiry as it includes a time limit of five years and includes the
disclaimer against isolated instances. However, it is doubtful that the
Kentucky inquiry would stand under the Southern District of Florida's
test unless the KBE could offer proof to justify the "additional burden"
imposed by the question. In other words, the burden is on the KBE to
convince the court that the broad inquiry is necessary to adequately
protect the public."4
3. Maine
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine enjoined the Maine Board of
Bar Examiner's use of a broad-based mental health inquiry.' The
questionnaire asked:
Have you ever received diagnosis of an emotional, nervous or mental
disorder?... If so, state the names and addresses of the psychologists,
psychiatrists or other medical practitioners who made such
diagnosis.... Within the ten (10) year period prior to the date of this
application, have you ever received treatment of emotional, nervous or
mental disorder?" 6
The court held that while the Maine Board's question was too broad, it
stated that it would be "permissible for the Board of Bar Examiners to
fashion other questions more directly related to behavior that can affect
the practice of law without violating the ADA."'0 7 Again, the Kentucky
question is not as broad as the stricken Maine question, as it limits the
period of inquiry to only five years and does not call for disclosure of
isolated instances of mental health treatment. However, the burden is on
the KBE to meet the requirement that it be "directly related to behavior
that can affect the practice of law." Considering that the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court set the standard that the inquiry be based on behavior, it
is doubtful that it would uphold the Kentucky inquiry, which focuses on
condition rather than behavior.
all questions involving mental illness." Id.
"o See supra notes 14 and 15.
1o5 In re Underwood, 1993 WL 649283 (Me. Dec. 7, 1993).
106 Id. at *2 n. 1 (quoting the Maine Bar Application, questions 29 and 30).
107 Id. at *2.
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B. Inquiries Allowed
Two United States district courts have upheld narrow mental health
inquiries that did not directly relate to behavior) ° The United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas allowed inquiries based
on specific mental illnesses, and the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois allowed the Illinois Board to continue
its practice of asking an applicant's references whether they knew of
any "affliction" which would affect the applicant's ability to practice
law.
1. Texas
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
upheld the Texas Board's question, which inquired about specific mental
illnesses such as "bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other
psychotic disorder."'0 9 The Texas Board did redraft its broader mental
health inquiries twice in response to this suit and to comply with the
provisions of the ADA."0 The redrafted questions, which the court
approved,"' currently ask:
Within the last ten years, have you been diagnosed with or have you
been treated [for] bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other
psychotic disorder? ... Have you, since attaining the age of eighteen
or within the last ten years, whichever period is shorter, been admitted
to a hospital or other facility for the treatment of bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other psychotic disorder?" 2
A positive response to any of these questions requires a medical release
by the applicant."'
08 McCreadyv. Illinois Bd. of Admissions to the Bar, No. 94-C-3582, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 791 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1995); Applicants v. Texas State Bd.
of Law Examiners, No. A-93-CA-740-55, 1994 WL 776693 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11,
1994).
109 Applicants, No. A-93-CA-740-SS, 1994 WL 776693, at *1.
110 Id. at *2.
'" Id. at *9-10.
"




The court held that the ADA allows inquiry into mental illness when
such investigation is "necessary to protect the integrity of the service
provided and the public."'1 4 The court concluded: "The rigorous
application procedure, including investigating whether an applicant has
been diagnosed or treated for certain serious mental illnesses, is indeed
necessary to ensure that Texas' lawyers are capable, morally and
mentally, to provide these important services." ' 5
This decision is the most permissive holding regarding the type of
allowable mental health inquiry, and some argue that it is itself an
anomaly as it is the only case to date allowing direct mental health
inquiries." '6 The court emphasized the importance of the inquiries'
limitation to "specific serious mental illnesses."' .7 While the phrase
"any other psychotic disorder" does not refer to any specific mental
illness diagnosis," 8 it certainly narrows the inquiry to a specific class
of mental illnesses which is much more narrow than the Kentucky
question's reference to any "emotional disturbance, nervous or mental
disorder.""' 9 Therefore, given the Texas court's emphasis on the
specific serious illness standard, it is doubtful that the Kentucky question
could be upheld even under the most permissive standard developed by
the courts to date.
14 Id. at *8.
I's Id.
116 See Cisneros, supra note 14, at 411.
"7 Applicants, No. A-93-CA-740-SS, 1994 WL 776693, at *9.
118 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders describes a
number of definitions given to the term "psychotic," ranging from the narrow
("delusions or prominent hallucinations"), to the very broad ("impairment that
grossly interferes with the capacity to meet ordinary demands of life"). AM.
PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 273 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. The latter definition has
been rejected as "probably far too inclusive."
119 While DSM-IV cautions against relying on terms such as "mental
disorders" for the broad array of conditions it includes, it defines the
term as
a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern
that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress
... or disability ... or with a significantly increased risk of suffering
death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom.... [l]t must
currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological,
or biological dysfunction in the individual.
Id. at xxi-xxii.
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2. Illinois
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
upheld the Illinois Board's practice of asking an applicant's references
"whether they had knowledge of any drug or alcohol dependency or
abuse by the applicant during the previous ten years, and whether they




The court held that this procedure "is distinguishable from questions
asked on the bar application itself because it is noncoercive and imposes
no additional burden on the applicant. Further, such an inquiry directed
at Plaintiffs references necessarily focuses on his behavior, not his
status.' |2 The court did not consider whether direct mental health




The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently accepted, on an
interim basis, recommendations to modify its mental health inquiries.'"
The recommendations made by a special panel of the New Jersey Panel
on Character included a time limit and consideration of "only those
conditions that would place the public at risk because they impact on the
judgment required by an attorney.' '124 The recommended question asks:
Have you, within the past twelve months been admitted to a
hospital or other facility for the treatment of bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other psychotic disorder?
Are you currently suffering from an emotional, mental, or nervous
disorder that impairs your judgment or that would otherwise adversely
20 McCready v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, No. 94-C-3582, 1995 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 791, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1995).
1 Id. at *19-20.
'2Id. The court rejected an argument that asking these questions to the
applicant's listed references called for "medical and/or psychiatric training." Id.
at *20. It noted that such questions were asked "to acquire information regarding
the applicants [sic] character and fitness," and that the references could simply
decline to answer the question if they felt that such knowledge was required. Id.




affect your ability to practice law in compliance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct, the Rules of Court, and applicable case law?"u
The New Jersey Panel rejected proposals to replace all mental health
inquiries with strictly behavior-based inquiries because "sole reliance on
conduct questions may not elicit information critical to an informed
decision regarding certification."' 26
By limiting the inquiry to what at least one federal district court has
determined to be "serious mental illnesses,"'27 and to conditions which
would afflict the applicant's ability to meet specific professional
standards, New Jersey has adopted a well-reasoned approach without
resorting to strictly behavior-based inquiries. Arguably, this approach
addresses even the strict requirements of Title I of the ADA, which allow
an inquiry as to whether or not the applicant can perform the functions
of the job "with or without reasonable accommodation."' 28
2. The National Conference of Bar Examiners
The National Conference of Bar Examiners (the "NCBE") conducts
character investigations for a number of jurisdictions, often including its
own "character and fitness" questionnaire.'2 9 The NCBE has recently
changed its mental health questions in an effort to conform to the ADA.
The revision of these questions limits disclosure to the past five years and
to specific conditions.' ° A general question regarding any mental,
emotional or nervous disorder is qualified by whether the applicant
indicates that the disorder, if left untreated, could affect the applicant's
ability to practice law in a competent matter.'
125 Id.
126 id.
128 See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
129 Robert L. Potts, Chair, National Conference of Bar Examiners,
Presentation to the Joint Conference on Disabilities Issues (Apr. 7, 1995) (outline
and appendices printed in Joint Conference on Disabilities Issues Materials
booklet). The NCBE provides a Character Report Service for 32 jurisdictions.
The KBE is a member of the NCBE and utilizes the NCBE background
check service for applicants from out of state. For Kentucky resident applicants,
the KBE conducts its own investigations. Gill Interview, supra note 7.
130 Potts, supra note 129, app. at 5.
'3' Id. The old questions were: "Have you ever been treated or counseled for
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Following a preamble which points out that information regarding
"situational counselling" need not be disclosed, the new questions ask:
Within the past five years, have you been diagnosed with or have you been
treated for bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other psychotic
disorder?... Do you currently have any condition or impairment (including
but not limited to, substance abuse, alcohol abuse, or a mental, emotional,
or nervous disorder or condition) which in any way currently affects, or if
untreated could affect, your ability to practice law in a competent and
professional manner? ... If your answer to [the previous question] is
affmnative, are the limitations or impairments caused by your mental health
condition or substance abuse problem reduced or ameliorated because you
receive ongoing treatment (with or without medication) or because you
participate in a monitoring program?' 2
While the NCBE tailored these new questions specifically to conform to the
ADA, it is not clear whether they go far enough to provide the protections
called for by the ADA.'33 The first question mirrors the language upheld
by the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in
Applicants v. Texas State Board of Law Examiners. ' The second question
narrows the language used by Kentucky, regarding any 'mental, emotional,
or nervous disorder," to whether the disorder currently affects, or could affect
if left untreated, the applicant's ability to practice law. While the NCBE
approach does not spell out the definition of "in a professional manner" as
does the New Jersey approach, 3 ' this qualification could go a long way
toward showing the relevancy of the inquiry.
IV. How THE KBE's INQUIRIES CAN
BE CHALLENGED UNDER THE ADA
The Kentucky Supreme Court Rules do not specifically provide for
judicial review of a KBE Character and Fitness Committee Advisory
any mental, emotional or nervous disorder or condition?" and "Have you ever
voluntarily entered or been involuntarily admitted to an institution for treatment
of a mental, emotional or nervous disorder or condition?" Id. app. at 3 (quoting
the former NBCF application, questions 28 and 29).
3 Id. app. at 5 (quoting the new NCBE application questions 27 and 28).
3 See supra notes 52-79 and accompanying text.
,34 No. A-93-CA-740-SS, 1994 WL 776693 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994); see
supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
5 See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
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opinion. ' Therefore, a Kentucky Bar applicant denied admission due
to either a refusal to answer the mental health questions, or a positive
response which leads to denial of admission, has no right to Kentucky
Supreme Court review, and must go to the federal system to ensure a
forum in which to seek relief. Under Title IH of the ADA, the protected
class is limited to "qualified individual[s] with a disability."'37
Therefore, the litigant must be otherwise qualified for membership in the
Bar and meet the ADA's definition of "disability" (which includes those
perceived to have a disability).'38
The ADA provides that the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth
in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 3 9 which prohibit "discrimination on
the basis of handicap in programs and activities that receive Federal
financial assistance, shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights for
enforcement" under Title ]1.140 "As with [§] 504, there is also a private
right of action for persons with disabilities, which includes the full
panoply of remedies.' 14' This includes the recovery of damages.
42
The actions of individual KBE members in regulating the member-
ship of the Kentucky Bar have been found to be judicial acts.1
43
Therefore, board members are immune from any personal liability based
on such acts to the same extent as the members of Kentucky courts.'"
However, a number of federal district courts have allowed the pursuit of
136 See Newsome v. Helman, 771 S.W.2d 47, 47 (Ky. 1989).
1742 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. V 1993).
138 See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
,39 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to -6, 2000e-8 to -9 (1988).
140 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. V 1993); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ADA
HANDBOOK, supra note 60, at 11-75.
141 Id. at 1-76.
142 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 345 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12133).
"4 Sparks v. Character and Fitness Comm., 859 F.2d 428, 434 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1011 (1989).
'44Id. The court's reasoning was as follows:
The act of considering an application to the bar is a judicial act. And it
is no less a judicial act simply because it is performed by non judicial
officers in whom the responsibility for the performance of such duties
is lawfully delegatedby the judiciary. Therefore, those who perform this
duty on behalf of the judiciary are entitled to the same judicial
immunity as would be enjoyed by judicial officers performing the same
act.
Id. (quoting Sparks v. Character and Fitness Comm. of Ky., 818 F.2d 541, 544-
45 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 484 U.S. 1022 (1988)).
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injunctive relief from the discriminatory practice involved in reaching the
judicial conclusion.'45
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
determinations of bar membership and federal district court jurisdiction
in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman.'46 The Court
held:
United States district courts ... have subject matter jurisdiction over
general challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in
nonjudicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final state-
court judgment in a particular case. They do not have jurisdiction,
however, over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases
arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that
the state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions
may be had only in this Court.'47
The Court also stated:
If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district court are
inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial in a judicial
proceeding of a particular plaintiff s application for admission to the
state bar, then the district court is in essence being called upon to
review the state-court decision. This the district court may not do.'
48
The Northern District of Illinois analyzed the jurisdiction question
under the Feldman standard in McCready v. Illinois Board of Admission
to the Bar. 49 The McCready court recognized that it did not have the
jurisdiction to review a state court ruling, "even when dressed up as a
civil rights suit."'50 However, the court "sifted" the complaint to find
sufficient general allegations regarding certain questions which indicated
a "general challenge to the constitutionality of certain of the Defendants'
41 See supra notes 80-104 and accompanying text.
146 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
47 Id. at 486.
148 Id. at 483-84 n.16.
14 No. 94-C-3582, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 791 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1995). For
a substantive analysis of the McCready case, see supra notes 120-22 and
accompanying text.
's' Id. at *14 n.3 (citing Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d. 750 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994)).
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practices and their relationship to the ADA.' '.. The general challenge
that the court considered was the assertion that the information asked by
the Illinois questions forced the applicant, and others like him, "to
undergo the burden and humiliation of additional mental and or physical
examinations based purely upon their disabilities."' z
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
initially ruled in Clark v. Board of Bar Examiners.53 that it did not
have jurisdiction over Clark's claim against the Virginia Board of Bar
Examiners. The court relied on Feldman and a 1979 Fourth Circuit
opinion'54 to determine that it lacked jurisdiction "to interfere in the
Board's proceedings to determine Clark's fitness to practice law.' 55
The court stated that Clark should pursue her ADA claim by petitioning
the Supreme Court of Virginia.'56
Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the court ruled that it had
improperly dismissed the suit. The court reinstated the case in order to
consider the plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory relief under
the ADA, but declined to review the request for the Virginia Board to
grant plaintiff a license to practice law. 57 In explaining its decision, the
court stated: "It is now clear to the Court that rather than attaching the
Board's treatment of Clark in particular, this case challenges the
defendants' right to enforce their rule of general application that all
applicants must answer question 20(b)."'5 Similarly, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida determined it -had
jurisdiction under the Feldman standard because the plaintiffs challenged
the Board's general rules and regulations and noted that the Board had
not even ruled on the plaintiffs' qualifications.'59
'i' Id. at *15.
152 Id. at *17.
1 861 F. Supp. 512, rev'd, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1994).
154 Woodward v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir.
1979), aff'g 454 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Va. 1978) (affirming dismissal of the
plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, despite the claim that the plaintiff
sought to challenge rules of general application based on assertions of racial
discrimination).
155 Clark, 861 F. Supp. at 516.
156 Td.
15' Id. at 518-19.
151 Id. at 519.
'19 Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F. Supp. 1489, 1495 (S.D.
Fla. 1994).
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Based on the various federal district courts' application of the
Feldman standard,' 61 it is probable that a federal district court would
find proper jurisdiction so long as the applicant asserts a claim against the
general practices of the KBE. However, it remains possible that a federal
district court would not find jurisdiction over a claim by an applicant who
had already been denied admittance to the Kentucky Bar, if that court
determined that the general claim could not be separated from the specific
denial of admittance. There appears to be no question that there would be
jurisdiction over a claim by an applicant who challenged the general rules
before a final determination had been made regarding admittance, such
as not being allowed to sit for the bar examination until the questionnaire
was completed.
A distinction can be raised between the Kentucky Character and
Fitness Committee and the committees in some of the states in which
federal district courts have addressed this issue. In two of the states
discussed above, power to regulate the bar is granted to the state supreme
courts by statute,'6 ' making it clear that the promulgation of the
admission rules are an administrative act by the judiciary branch, even
though the final determination of admission to the bar is a judicial act. It
could be argued that Kentucky's state constitutional grant of authority to
regulate the bar'62 makes the promulgation of such rules judicial acts,
rather than administrative acts by the judicial branch. Federal district
courts have jurisdiction over administrative procedures utilized by state
courts, but not over judicial acts. An appeal from an judicial act of a
state supreme court could only be made to the United States Supreme
Court.
If the only challenge that could be made to the KBE's rules can be
made to the United States Supreme Court, such a challenge would be
much more difficult than in other states. However, regardless of how the
Kentucky Constitution divides power among the branches, a neutral
federal court will probably define the promulgation of rules to be an
administrative act carried out by the judiciary, giving a federal district
court jurisdiction in cases involving the violation of a federal law, and
thus find that it has jurisdiction.
160 See supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
161 TEx. GOVT CODE ANN. §§ 82.004(a)-.022 (West 1988); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-3910 (Michie 1991).




Arguably, a mental health inquiry that is not based strictly on
behavior cannot survive an ADA challenge; 63 however, the current
trend does not require such an extreme deviation from the KBE's
approach.'" It is not clear how the standard for permissible mental
health inquiries by bar examiners will develop as more courts address this
issue. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that Kentucky's question could survive
a challenge under even the most lenient standards established by the
recent trend. s5 Unless a higher court reverses this trend, it is just a
matter of time before Kentucky's mental health inquiries are challenged
under the ADA.
The current trend does not require the KBE to abandon all mental
health inquiries and adopt questions which completely replace such
inquiries with behavior-based ones. If the KBE does not wish to move to
strictly behavior-based inquiries, the most reasoned approach would be
to adopt middle-ground questions such as those proposed by the NCBE
or the New Jersey Board of Bar Examiners,'66 as well as adding
language regarding one's physical ability to perform up to professional
standards, 67 until this issue is further worked out in the court system.
By adopting a more restrictive set of questions, the KBE can show a
good-faith effort to conform to the ADA and better ensure that it will not
have to endure the expense and negative publicity inherent in any civil
rights suit of this kind.
Lanny King
163 See supra notes 52-79 and accompanying text.
16' See supra notes 80-107 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 59, 60 and accompanying text.
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